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ABSTRACT—How does theory of mind become explicit? In
this article, we provide a brief overview of theoretical
accounts and then review longitudinal findings on the
development of theory of mind from infancy to the pre-
school years. Long-term predictive relations among con-
ceptually related measures of implicit and explicit theory-
of-mind reasoning support a conceptual continuity view of
the transition from an implicit to an explicit understanding
of the mind. We discuss alternative, minimalist accounts
of infant psychological reasoning (e.g., two-systems mod-
els, submentalizing theory) and their implications for the
development of theory of mind in light of the evidence.
Longitudinal findings further support a developmental
enrichment view of joint attention as a foundation of the-
ory of mind and early social interaction as a powerful
mechanism in the development of this ability. Finally, we
highlight the importance of longitudinal data for our
understanding of conceptual development from infancy to
the preschool years.
KEYWORDS—infancy; psychological reasoning; conceptual
continuity
HOWDOES CHILDREN’S THEORY OF MIND BECOME
EXPLICIT?
A 5-year-old who talks about what people want and think when
predicting and explaining agents’ actions articulates an explicit
understanding of mental states, that is, a theory of mind. A 1-
year-old who points to an event happening behind an adult’s
back to attract the adult’s attention and interest may also possess
a theory of mind, albeit an implicit one, that leads the infant to
consider others’ goals, intentions, knowledge, and beliefs in pre-
verbal communicative interaction. Is there continuity from the 1-
year-old’s to the 5-year-old’s mentalistic understanding of
agency? If so, what needs to develop to make an implicit theory
of mind explicit? Or does mindreading begin much later, with a
slow and effortful acquisition of explicit mental state knowledge
based on language and executive function? In this article, we
review the contribution of recent longitudinal studies on the
development of theory of mind to answering these fundamental
questions. Before turning to the evidence, we briefly sketch the
most important current theoretical views on the development of
theory of mind from infancy to preschool age.
The Conceptual Continuity View
Explicit theory of mind is characterized by the attribution of
beliefs and desires to agents. Desire reasoning precedes belief
reasoning by about 2 years. Only around the age of 4 years do
children begin to understand explicitly that an agent’s beliefs
can differ from reality and that beliefs, including false beliefs,
are causally relevant for the agent’s course of action (Wellman,
Cross, & Watson, 2001).
The claim that infants possess an implicit theory of mind is
based on a large body of evidence for psychological reasoning in
the first and second years of life (Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian,
2016). Infants view others’ actions as structured by intentions
(Woodward, 2009). For example, when observing a hand reach-
ing for and grasping one of two objects (e.g., a ball, not a bear),
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infants as young as 5 months preferentially encode the action
goal rather than the spatiotemporal properties of the reaching
and grasping action (Woodward, 1998). By 6 months, they keep
track of whether the agent who grasped one of the two objects
could see both of the objects before choosing (Luo & Johnson,
2009), thus integrating information on agents’ perception with
goal representation. Starting around 9 months, infants engage in
joint attentional interactions, attempting to align their own and
their partner’s goals and attention (Tomasello, 2018). In the sec-
ond year, infants read others’ intentions proficiently, for
instance, when imitating a failed attempt or attempting to help
an adult reach a goal (Meltzoff, 1995; Warneken, Gr€afenhain, &
Tomasello, 2012). Furthermore, results of some 30 studies that
used looking time and anticipatory looking, as well as interac-
tive paradigms, suggest that infants can take agents’ false beliefs
into account when forming action expectations (see Baillargeon,
Scott, & He, 2010; Sodian, 2016, for reviews). For instance, 15-
month-olds expected an agent to act consistently with her or his
false belief in a violation-of-expectation paradigm (Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005), and 25-month-olds did so in an anticipa-
tory-looking task (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007).1
Interpreting these findings (Baillargeon et al., 2016), research-
ers have argued that infants have a system of mentalistic action
prediction and explanation that is assumed to be conceptually
continuous with a later explicit theory of mind. According to this
account, 2- and 3-year-olds have a concept of belief but fail tra-
ditional false-belief tasks because of response generation and
inhibitory demands of these tasks. In fact, in a recent study
(Setoh, Scott, & Baillargeon, 2016), children as young as
30 months succeeded in a traditional false-belief task with
reduced processing demands.
Two-Systems Views
While high-level (conceptual continuity) accounts propose that
infants have a conceptual understanding of belief, two-systems
views assume a rudimentary preconceptual (Perner & Roessler,
2012) form of implicit mental state representation in infancy that
is restricted by signature limits (e.g., the capacity to represent
relational rather than propositional attitudes; Butterfill &
Apperly, 2013; Fizke, Butterfill, van de Loo, Reindl, & Rakoczy,
2017). Implicit false-belief processing is assumed to be fast and
automatic but inflexible, while explicit processing is slower and
effortful, and dependent on language but more flexible. Implicit
and explicit mindreading systems may be relatively indepen-
dent, based on different neurocognitive mechanisms, as is
suggested by findings on implicit mindreading deficits in adults
with autism spectrum disorder who are competent in explicit
theory-of-mind tasks (see Frith & Frith, 2008).
Developmental Enrichment Views
Developmental enrichment theories propose that theory of mind
is rooted in infancy but involves developmental change. Critics
of the conceptual continuity view have argued that infants’ suc-
cess on implicit false-belief tasks may not reflect mental state
representation, but can be accounted for on a lower level, such
as an implicit understanding of behavior that may come from
innate capacities for statistical learning, together with biases for
attention to eyes, faces, and human motion (Ruffman, 2014).
Such an early understanding of action may develop into an
explicit theory of mind through executive functions and lan-
guage-based social interaction (e.g., Devine & Hughes, 2014;
Ruffman, Perkins, & Taumoepeau, 2012). Shared intentionality
theory emphasizes social and communicative interactions with
others, rather than individual cognition as the source of develop-
mental change; this theory traces the development of theory of
mind from a beginning coordination of perspectives in joint
attention in infancy to an explicit understanding of belief at pre-
school age (Tomasello, 2018).
Submentalizing Theory
In a radically minimalist account, Heyes (2014) proposes that
infants’ performance on implicit false-belief tasks is the result of
low-level perceptual features of stimuli (color, shape, or move-
ment). Thus, implicit mindreading is not mindreading at all, but
low-level perception-based submentalizing, relying on domain-
general neurocognitive mechanisms. In this view, explicit theory
of mind is not based on an earlier, preverbal, preconceptual
form of mindreading, but it emerges, depending on language
and executive function, in the third year of life.
Predictions from Theoretical Models
Conceptual continuity theory predicts both cross-sectional and
longitudinal interrelations among conceptually related measures
of mental state attribution. These relations should be indepen-
dent of more general cognitive functioning or language ability.
In particular, implicit and explicit false-belief understanding
should be linked longitudinally. Similarly, developmental
enrichment theories predict relations between theoretically rele-
vant behaviors in infancy, such as gaze following, joint attention,
or action imitation, and later explicit theory of mind (indepen-
dent of general cognitive functioning). They also predict long-
term effects of preverbal and verbal communicative interaction.
Moreover, conceptual continuity and developmental enrichment
theories are not mutually exclusive, since continuity on the con-
ceptual level can coexist with enrichment processes. Two-sys-
tems theories are also consistent with longitudinal relations of
preconceptual implicit responses in infancy and later explicit
theory-of-mind reasoning. However, since different
1A debate has arisen about infants’ false-belief understanding because
researchers have failed to replicate some findings of original studies on this topic.
Whereas the authors of these studies attributed these replication failures mostly to
procedural differences (Baillargeon, Buttelmann, & Southgate, 2018), critics have
called into question the claim that infants have an implicit theory of mind (Poulin-
Dubois et al., 2018). Researchers agree on the need for collaborative, large-scale
replication studies that involve many labs and are conceptual, to measure infants’
false-belief attribution.
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neurocognitive processes are supposed to underlie implicit and
explicit theory of mind, strong and systematic long-term longitu-
dinal relations are not predicted. In contrast, submentalizing
theory does not predict longitudinal relations of infants’ and
preschoolers’ performance on theory-of-mind tasks.
In the remainder of this article, we review the longitudinal
evidence for conceptual continuity and developmental enrich-
ment theories of theory-of-mind development, which reveals
some support for both models. Following the predictions of con-
ceptual continuity theory, we look at longitudinal relations
between conceptually related measures of mental state attribu-
tion. We then turn to specific predictions about the link of
implicit and explicit false-belief understanding. With respect to
developmental enrichment theories, we focus on predictions
about the roots of theory of mind in joint attention and the role
of mother–child interaction in the transition from an implicit to
an explicit theory of mind.
LONGITUDINAL STUDIES OF THEORY-OF-MIND
DEVELOPMENT
Conceptual Continuity: Infants’ Reasoning About Goals,
Beliefs, and Desires Predicts Explicit Theory-of-Mind
Reasoning
A first wave of longitudinal studies, conducted more than
10 years ago, tested for predictive relations between infants’
propensity to understand actions as goal directed and these chil-
dren’s false-belief understanding 3–4 years later. Researchers
identified a long-term association between goal encoding in
infancy and false-belief understanding at preschool age (Well-
man, Lopez-Duran, LaBounty, & Hamilton, 2008; Wellman,
Phillips, Dunphy-Lelii, & LaLonde, 2004). Reduced attention
and differentiation between test trials in the goal-encoding task
was associated with false-belief understanding 3 years later,
independent of IQ, executive function, and language. Another
study found similar results (Aschersleben, Hofer, & Jovanovic,
2008). Yet another study showed that the findings were domain
specific: Goal encoding was associated with false-belief under-
standing, while physical reasoning in infancy was not (Yam-
aguchi, Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Van Marle, 2009). These findings
support the view of conceptual continuity from preverbal psy-
chological reasoning in infancy to explicit verbal reasoning
about mental states at 4–5 years, and suggest that such continu-
ity is not mediated by language acquisition or the emergence of
executive functions. However, these early longitudinal studies
were limited because researchers studied only relations between
developmental endpoints and addressed only one component of
infant psychological reasoning—goal encoding.
In a more recent comprehensive longitudinal study, the The-
ory of Mind in Infancy and Early Childhood (TOMII/TOMEC)
study, researchers assessed both social cognition and social
responsiveness in infancy, then followed up with theory of mind,
executive function, and language measures from 2 to 6 years
(Sodian & Kristen-Antonow, 2015; Sodian et al., 2016). These
researchers identified associations over time between infant psy-
chological understanding and later theory of mind. Goal encod-
ing at 7 months, implicit false-belief understanding at
18 months, and desire reasoning at 24 months were all related
to theory of mind, independent of verbal IQ (Sodian et al., 2016;
see Figure 1).
One task in this study assessed belief and intention under-
standing in a morally relevant context: An accidental transgres-
sor unintentionally caused damage to another child because of a
false belief about a critical object (Killen, Mulvey, Richardson,
Jampol, & Woodward, 2011). Infants’ tendency at 7 months to
encode a grasping action as goal directed and their tendency at
18 months to correctly anticipate an agent’s action when the
agent held a false belief about the location of an object were
associated with 5-year-olds’ evaluation of an accidental trans-
gressor’s intentions as positive. Intention understanding is a core
aspect of both moral reasoning and theory of mind. In particular,
the ability to infer an agent’s positive or neutral intentions
despite the negative consequences of his or her action is critical
for moral judgment and psychological reasoning more generally.
Thus, these findings indicate that central parts of social under-
standing in childhood may come from action understanding in
infancy. Core elements of mentalistic reasoning, that is, reason-
ing about goals, beliefs, and desires in infancy, were related to
explicit reasoning about intentions and beliefs in early child-
hood; this supports the idea that a mentalistic system of action
prediction in infancy is developmentally continuous with a cor-
responding conceptual system in early childhood.
Figure 1. Longitudinal correlations among goal encoding, desire under-
standing, implicit false-belief understanding (FBU), explicit FBU, moral
FBU, and moral intention understanding between 7 and 60 months of age
(based on data from Sodian et al., 2016).Note. Controlling for verbal IQ
48 months, working memory 7 months, -- = p < .10; - = p < .05.
– = p < .01.
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A high-level interpretation of infant psychological reasoning
would further predict intertask correlations in infancy. Yet in
the aforementioned study (Sodian et al., 2016), the representa-
tion of action goals had only a marginally significant correlation
with false beliefs in infancy (independent of working memory).
Similarly, in a separate study, intention understanding was asso-
ciated with false-belief understanding in 14- to 18-month-olds
(Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016). However, this was the only inter-
task correlation among intention, true belief, false belief, and
desire understanding, indicating that mental state reasoning in
infancy may be less well integrated than it is at preschool age.
Furthermore, evidence supports convergent validity of different
assessments of the same construct for goal encoding (Thoermer,
Woodward, Sodian, Perst, & Kristen, 2013), but not for implicit
false-belief understanding (D€orrenberg, Rakoczy, & Liszkowski,
2018).
Conceptual Continuity from Implicit to Explicit
Understanding of False Belief
In the TOMII/TOMEC study, researchers found robust longitudi-
nal relations, independent of verbal IQ, between an anticipa-
tory-looking implicit false-belief task at 18 months and explicit
false-belief tasks administered in yearly intervals at 4–6 years,
as well as one belief-based intention task (Kloo, Kristen-Anto-
now, & Sodian, 2020; Sodian et al., 2016; Thoermer, Sodian,
Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012). Furthermore, implicit and expli-
cit false-belief tasks differed in their relations to executive func-
tions: While explicit false-belief understanding was associated
with executive functions, implicit false-belief understanding did
not correlate with either one of the executive function tasks
administered at different points between ages 2 and 5 years (see
Grosse Wiesmann, Friederici, Singer, & Steinbeis, 2017; Low,
2010, for similar findings). The relation of explicit false-belief
understanding and executive functioning was independent of
implicit false-belief understanding. Furthermore, the correlation
of implicit and explicit false-belief understanding was indepen-
dent of both earlier and later measures of executive functioning
(see Figure 2).
These findings support the idea that false-belief understand-
ing is continuous from infancy to middle childhood and may be
masked in 2- and 3-year-olds due to the processing demands of
explicit tasks (Baillargeon et al., 2010). However, the sharp divi-
sion between implicit and explicit false-belief processing with
regard to executive functioning may be seen as inconsistent with
the idea of a single neurocognitive mechanism and may be bet-
ter accounted for by a (moderate) two-systems account.
The TOMII/TOMEC study is the only long-term longitudinal
study that found correlations between implicit and explicit false-
belief reasoning. In two recent studies, researchers found no lon-
gitudinal relations of performance in a violation-of-expectation
false-belief task in infancy and explicit false-belief performance
at 5 years, but one significant correlation of false-belief under-
standing in an interactive task in infancy and an understanding
of diverse beliefs at 4–5 years (Poulin-Dubois, Azar, Elkaim, &
Burnside, 2020). Similarly, with respect to concurrent or short-
term longitudinal relations, the evidence is mixed. While one
study (Low, 2010) found that explicit and implicit tasks were
correlated, another (Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017) reported no
significant correlations. Thus, more longitudinal evidence, using
more than one method to assess implicit false-belief understand-
ing in infancy, is needed.
Developmental Enrichment: Joint Attention as a
Foundation of Theory of Mind
Declarative joint attention in preverbal communication, which
carries information about or attitudes toward an object or event,
involves a rudimentary representation of another person’s cur-
rent state of information, that is, an implicit theory of mind
Figure 2. Longitudinal correlations. among implicit false-belief understanding (FBU), explicit FBU, and executive functioning (EF) between 18 and
70 months of age (based on data from Kloo et al., 2020).Note. = p > .05; -- = p < .05; - = p < .01.
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(Camaioni, Perucchini, Bellagamba, & Colonnesi, 2004). In
experimental work on informative pointing, 1-year-olds con-
veyed information depending on whether an adult was knowl-
edgeable or ignorant about the location of an object, thus
indicating a representation of the other’s epistemic state (Lisz-
kowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008).
Few longitudinal studies of joint attention and theory of mind
have spanned the age range from infancy to 4 or 5 years. In two
studies, infants’ comprehension of gaze (Brooks & Meltzoff,
2015) or pointing (Kristen, Sodian, Thoermer, & Perst, 2011) at
9–10 months was associated with the production of mental state
language at 2–3 years, independent of general language abili-
ties. In the first study (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2015), mental state
language at 30 months, in turn, was related to theory-of-mind
reasoning at 4½ years, independent of control variables. These
findings suggest that a preverbal implicit representation of men-
tal states in joint attention may be accessed explicitly only when
mental state terms are available, which may be a crucial factor
in developing a representational theory of mind.
However, in the TOMII/TOMEC study, a direct path from joint
attentional skills at 12 months to false-belief understanding at
50 months emerged, independent of mental state language:
Declarative point production (in which infants pointed to an
object out of the experimenter’s sight) at 12 months predicted
false-belief understanding at 50 months, independent of impera-
tive pointing (in which infants demanded an object from an exper-
imenter) and more general cognitive functioning. Although both
mirror self-recognition and level 1 visual perspective taking were
also associated with joint attention, the relation of declarative
pointing and later false-belief understanding was not mediated by
these correlates (Sodian & Kristen-Antonow, 2015). The speci-
ficity of declarative joint attention as a precursor to theory of mind
was also seen on the neural level (K€uhn-Popp, Kristen, Paulus,
Meinhardt, & Sodian, 2016). Thus, perspective-taking abilities
appear to be rooted in joint attention (see Moll & Meltzoff, 2011).
Developmental Enrichment: Early Social Interaction and
Theory of Mind Development
How do engagement experiences in joint attentional episodes
promote the development of theory of mind in children? Accord-
ing to shared intentionality theory (Tomasello, 2018), sharing
information and emotion from different perspectives in preverbal
declarative joint attention, which is followed by language-based
interactions that involve the expression of different perspectives
or attitudes toward a situation or an event, lead eventually to a
reflective understanding of one’s own or others’ misrepresenta-
tions of reality.
Toddlers’ joint engagement experiences with their mothers
were related to preschoolers’ theory-of-mind abilities (Nelson,
Adamson, & Bakeman, 2008). Higher false-belief scores at pre-
school age were associated with more time in coordinated joint
engagement at 18–21 months, and in symbol-infused joint
engagement at 27–30 months, independent of language
comprehension. Even at 10 months, looking-time responses in a
goal-encoding task were related to infants’ engagement in joint
attention in a mother–infant play session (Brune & Woodward,
2007). In the TOMII/TOMEC study, as early as 7 months, look-
ing times in a goal-encoding task were related to maternal emo-
tional availability, assessed in mother–infant play interaction,
independent of children’s temperament, infants’ working mem-
ory, and maternal education (Licata et al., 2014). Longitudinally,
mothers’ emotional availability when their infants were
7 months was associated with children’s theory-of-mind abilities
at 4 years, when controlling for children’s temperamental and
cognitive characteristics, as well as mothers’ emotional availabil-
ity at 4 years (Licata, Kristen, & Sodian, 2016). Further analy-
ses revealed that maternal cognition talk when children were
24 months mediated the influence of early emotional availability
on false-belief understanding at preschool age (Kristen-Anto-
now, Licata-Dandel, M€uller, & Sodian, 2018). Thus, highly emo-
tionally available mothers may promote their toddlers’
engagement by adapting to the cognitive needs of the children
by using cognitive language to highlight perspectives and
thereby promote theory-of-mind abilities (Slaughter, Peterson, &
Carpenter, 2009). In summary, recent longitudinal evidence
indicates that infants’ early interaction experiences with their
caregivers affect children’s development of theory of mind, and
that this impact is largely mediated by caregivers’ use of mental
state language in interactions with their toddlers.
CONCLUSIONS
The longitudinal evidence we reviewed in this article supports
the idea that a mentalistic system of action prediction in infancy
is conceptually continuous with an explicit theory of mind at
preschool age. Goal encoding, declarative joint attention, and
implicit false-belief understanding, as well as desire reasoning
in infancy were associated, individually and jointly, with explicit
theory-of-mind abilities at preschool age, independent of more
general cognitive functioning. In particular, the link between
implicit and explicit false-belief understanding was not only
independent of verbal ability but also of executive functioning.
These findings are consistent with a high-level conceptual conti-
nuity account, but also with the view that a preconceptual impli-
cit mindreading system precedes an explicit theory of mind.
They also provide evidence against strictly nonmentalistic
accounts of infant psychological reasoning. Longitudinal evi-
dence further supports developmental enrichment theories that
propose joint attention as the foundation of theory-of-mind
development and shared intentionality in caregiver–child inter-
action as a powerful mechanism. However, we still lack longitu-
dinal evidence on implicit-to-explicit theory-of-mind
development. Longitudinal data are needed to resolve controver-
sies on foundational issues of the development of mindreading,
and they can help us understand interrelations among funda-
mental processes of social cognitive development.
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